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What does ‘taking up Weber and Foucault’ mean? 
 
Methodologically, the long-term research project of which this paper attempts to resume 
some of the relevant results, apart from being historical in its design, and in particular 
following the Nietzsche-Weber-Foucaldian genealogy, is also concerned with the proper 
way to take up the work of ‘serious authors’. The expression ‘serious authors’, in lack of 
a better term, designates those authors who, even taking heed of the critique to 
authorship voiced by Barthes and Foucault, are worthwhile taking seriously as authors. 
The ‘What is an author?’ debate does not, and cannot, mean that the personal 
component of research is irrelevant, and that it is not possible that singular figures might 
come up fundamentally new and strikingly relevant ideas. It rather diagnosed a peculiar, 
‘romantic-titanic’ aspect of modern social scientific theorising: the pretence to claim that 
any idea, article or book written by a concrete person can be attributed to him as her as 
‘own’, beyond the legal problem of plagiarism. In contrast to this position, Foucault 
showed that authors belonging to a particular time and space spoke from inside a given 
discursive formation, whose rules they simply took for granted. 
 ‘Serious authors’, however, are those figures who for one reason or another could 
no longer speak from inside the discourse which they learnt from their teachers, taken 
for granted by practically all scholars working in a given field, and therefore were forced 
to develop a new and genuinely personal long-term research project. Nietzsche, Weber 
and Foucault, among others, belong to this category; and so the understanding of their 
work poses considerable problems. The novelty of their ideas is immediately evident to 
anybody reading them; yet, it is simply ‘in the nature of things’, and especially of ‘human 
nature’, that very few people are able to handle such novelty directly, and instead they try 
to reposition their work in the context of received wisdom, reducing their distinct 
novelty into the intellectual horizon they tried to escape – not because of a dogged 
search for novelty at any price, but as truly a matter of fate. 
 However, even once their singularity is recognised, and the novelty and exact 
character of the work understood, the best use to make of their ideas remains a problem. 
The reception of such ‘master works’ seems to oscillate around and in between two 
poles. One is concerned with commentary, aiming at a proper understanding of the 
work, rendering justice to its full complexity. While such efforts are eminently important 
and useful, they have the drawback of focusing attention on ideas already pronounced, 
research completed, thus producing a certain closure. The other pole concerns, on the 
contrary, some of the central ideas of such master thinkers, identified and taken out of 
context, given a definition, and used as tools to produce a new research. Foucault’s ‘bio-
politics’ or ‘governmentality’, or Weber’s ‘charisma’ or ‘instrumental rationality’ are 
prominent examples. The problem of a closure, however, applies even here: any single 
‘concept’, even when it is more or less properly understood, could lead into directions 
quite different from the spirit of the original work, and the danger is that in this way the 
concept will be reinserted into the same old taken for granted ‘mainstream’ way of 
thinking, which is however unsatisfactory, as this was the original reason why such 
master-thinkers started to develop not simply a few new term, but an entire research path. 
And so, instead of writing on Weber and Foucault, or ‘using’ some of their concepts, the 
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way to use their work to full potential is to enter and take further the very research path 
the were experimenting with. 
 Far from solving the problem, however, this is only the starting point of the real 
methodological difficulties. This is because, most evidently, it is simply impossible to 
‘take up’ the project of Weber or Foucault, or for any other thinker, and for a number of 
reasons. We live, after all, in a different time and place; we face, in spite of continuities, 
different problems, have different life experiences behind us, and can make use of a 
vastly different and in some ways much improved background literature. And, most 
importantly, the idea of as if entering the ‘mind’ of another thinker, trying practically to 
assume his interests and concerns, thus almost his identity, is an undertaking full of 
difficulties, even of a simply psychological kind.  
 The way out lies in a certain combination of the comparative and hermeneutical 
methods. This means that, instead of selecting just one thinker whose research one 
intends to take up, it is necessary to select a few, preferably with already some links 
between them; but instead of taking up some of their ideas, especially restricting them to 
the ones most discussed, to enter the depth of their thinking, in the manner that is 
usually reserved for a hermeneutical study of a single thinker only. In this manner the 
dangers associated with an obsessive ‘miming’ or even ‘stalking’ the work of a single 
figure, characteristic in particular to Marxism and Freudianism, but also of the schools 
formed around the various real or presumed ‘master thinkers’ of the past century is 
avoided, and the result will neither be a mere eclecticism. The central idea, rather, is to 
penetrate the thought of some of the most important thinkers of the past century in such 
a profound manner that one can identify, whether through certain blind spots within 
their works, or in terms of a common direction to which they point to, certain research 
tracks that would offer the best chances to continue, fruitfully, the work they pioneered. 
 This is particular helpful concerning the theme of this presentation, the ideas of 
Weber and Foucault about the contribution of religious factors to the genesis of 
modernity. On a first look, the relevance of this question for the work of the two master 
thinkers (or ‘serious authors’) seems most different. For Weber, the ‘Protestant ethic’ 
thesis about the ‘spirit’ of capitalism is certainly one of the best known and indeed 
central part of his work. In the case of Foucault, however, religious aspects played a 
minuscule role in his genealogy of modernity, until – at a certain particular juncture of his 
work – the question assumed vital significance. A joint study of Weber and Foucault in 
this respect is not only helpful for mutually illuminating the work of the others, but also 
to identify, jointly, two specific research paths that seem particularly important to take 
up: one representing a singular and striking omission in their works, while the other a 
research path, beyond the temporal horizon of their works, which was rendered possible 
by recent advances in concrete research, especially in archaeology. 
 Before entering the work of Weber and Foucault concerning the religious roots 
of modernity, a few words should be said on the pioneering novelty of the approach they 
followed, due – as always – to the inspiration of Nietzsche. 
 
The puzzling positive link between religion and modernity 
 
It is one of the basic, indeed defining features of modern thought to consider the 
disappearance of religion as necessary outcome of social evolution. The idea is deeply 
rooted in the Enlightenment, especially its ‘radical’ version (Israel 2000), central in the 
form of the ‘death of god’ thesis for classical German philosophy (de Lubac 1949), so 
much so that Marx already could assert, in the Introduction to his Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, that the criticism of religion having been accomplished, the task of 
‘critical thought’ must shift elsewhere. This approach not only proclaimed the future 
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irrelevance of religion, but also denied that religion played any positive role in history. 
The ‘critique of religion’ perspective even became a dominant feature of 19th century 
(German Protestant) theology, in the form of Biblical Criticism, which exerted a strong 
impact on philosophy, historiography, and even sociology. 
 It is against this general orientation that Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals represents 
a radical alteration of course. Nietzsche not only reasserted the vital significance of 
religion in human history, but did so by presenting a complex socio-psychological 
argument, way beyond the standard Enlightenment treatment considering religion at best 
a myth, but mostly a deceit and priestly lie; and, going even further, argued that secular 
modernity, with its central values, only represents a secularised version of Christian 
morality, and is therefore deeply nihilistic, questioning the very legitimacy of modernity. 
 Max Weber not only followed closely, in the ‘spirit’ of his historically oriented 
research Nietzsche’s genealogy as method, but also came to assign a particularly 
important role to religious factors in the rise of modern capitalism, presenting an 
argument that from the perspective of Enlightenment reasoning seemed utterly 
paradoxical. As a result, through the ‘Protestant ethic’ thesis, the recognition of the 
positive impact of religion on the rise of the modern world has become a standard, 
though by no means uncontroversial and often much misunderstood factor in the rise of 
modernity. 
 However, the Nietzsche-Weber axis was not the only way through which the 
recognition of the importance of religious factors for social life re-entered, paradoxically 
and against the spirit of the Enlightenment, classical sociologically. Quite astonishingly, 
the other main classic founding figure of sociology and contemporary of Weber, Emile 
Durkheim also eventually came to assign, against the word and spirit of his earlier work, 
a central importance to religion in social life, and devoted much of the last part of his 
work to writing the Elementary Forms of Religious Life. This fact, that the two figures who, 
since a century, by practically every social scientists are recognised as the ‘founding 
fathers’ of sociology devoted the most mature part of their work to the study of religion 
was so strikingly against Enlightenment-based modern prejudices that they were simply 
not followed, no matter how this inserted a glaring paradox at the heart of sociology and 
in particular social theory.  
 This fact is even more striking as a simple analysis can show that this shift of 
interest in each of the three cases was by no means an idiosyncrasy, but concerned the 
heart of the identity of each of these figures – and jointly at the personal, social and 
professional level. Nietzsche did not study religion by professional training; rather, he 
started to write the Genealogy after a particular kind of self-reflexive meditation or 
‘spiritual exercise’ (Hadot 1993), the writing of a new Preface to the second editions of 
most of his previous works.i Weber similarly started work on the Protestant Ethic after a 
long period of psychosomatic illness which was induced by an identity crisis, and his 
entire ‘sociology of religions’ project, deeply concerned with the identity of the West, was 
explicitly spun by a deeply personal line on investigation, as reflected in the first words of 
the extremely important ‘Author’s Introduction’ to the planned 5-volume series.ii Finally, 
Durkheim’s interest in the sociology of religion was sparked by his reading of Robertson 
Smith’s Lectures on the Religion of the Semites. 
 It is here the relevance of Foucault’s interest in the role played by religious 
factors in the origins of modernity can be properly situated. Until the first volume of the 
History of Sexuality series, there were very little references to matters of religion in 
Foucault’s works; and these were limited mostly to the spatial location or architecture of 
buildings of originally religious use. It is thus only in the second part of the 1970s that 
Foucault started explicitly to reflect on the role of religious factors, in the context of a 
theme, the study of sexuality, which was very close to the heart of his own identity, and 
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the problems Foucault felt to have with it – a moment associated with Foucault’s ‘crisis’; 
and also a moment in which he started to become explicitly interested in the work of 
Weber.iii 
 Thus, while the study of religious factors by no means played such an important 
role in the life-work of Foucault than in Weber’s, even here the modality of similarities is 
evident; it can also be reinforced by a shared, striking omission. This concerns the 
Renaissance, especially the connections between the collapse of the Renaissance and the 
emergence of the Reformation; a connection which they failed to investigate and, 
instead, engaged upon a long-term comparative genealogical project. 
 
In order to establish and investigate this point, it is necessary to present in some details 
how the claim concerning this presumed omission can be supported. 
 
Max Weber and the Protestant Ethic thesis 
 
Until Max Weber’s work, and the almost contemporaneous work of Johan Huizinga, it 
was generally asserted, following claims made by the Enlightenment, that the modern 
world, and in particular modern capitalism, grew out of the Renaissance, and that a 
central connection between the Renaissance and modernity was secularisation. The 
works of Weber and Huizinga, in spite of all their differences, jointly helped to radically 
alter this orientation, by reassigning the Renaissance to the medieval period, and instead 
focusing on the Reformation as the source of modernity. As a result, sociologists and 
historically oriented social scientists in general lost almost all interest in the Renaissance 
as a period.  
 The problem is that, even fully recognising the significance of Weber’s work, the 
exact nature of the link between the medieval world, the Renaissance as a transition 
period at the end of the Middle Ages and the Reformation as a step towards modernity 
still must be solved. In particular, the paradoxical nature of the Weber thesis cannot be 
ignored. Weber recognised the connection between business success and Protestant 
sectarianism, but this connection was still a paradox; and the condition of possibility of 
such a positive connection was established in this peculiar period, the High Renaissance 
(from about the mid-Quattrocento); a period often simply identified with the 
Renaissance. Weber’s ignoring of this period could well be attributed to the deep 
suspicion that German Protestants, not without its own reasons, had towards it. Yet, this 
is not a sufficient justification; the collapse of the Renaissance should have been amply 
studied by historical sociologists, who were wrong to follow Weber here. And a study of 
this collapse would have shifted interest to another basic omission of comparative 
historical sociology, and a quite stunning one: the almost complete ignoring of the 
Byzantine Empire. 
 Thus, Weber’s focus concerning the religious roots of modernity must be 
complemented by a study of the collapse of the Renaissance, including the secular 
aspects that emerged there only at its collapse, in the context of a sociology of the 
connections between Eastern Christianity and the Byzantine Empire. 
 
Interestingly enough, solely by following the internal logic of Foucault’s relevant work, 
especially the various segments about ‘pastoral power’, also lead to the same juncture, a 
study of the collapse of the Renaissance, which Foucault similarly failed to pursue, and 
instead jumped straight into a study of Antiquity.  
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Foucault: problematising pastoral power 
 
Foucault’s substantial interest in religion was sparked by his planned study on the history 
of sexuality and its focus, as evident in the first volume published in 1976, on the 
practice of confession. The original plan was to write in quick succession five further 
volumes, based on the conceptual tools developed for the study of power in his two 
books published in the middle of the 1970s; but a planned cursory turn to the problem 
of Christian confession, based on the lectures of 1975, produced the opposite result, 
radically altering the entire direction of Foucault’s work. 
 The manner in which this happened can be dramatically reconstructed on the 
basis of the 1978 Collège de France lectures. After the Sabbatical year, which was 
supposed to be devoted to the finishing of the five volumes, Foucault started his lectures 
by emphasising the continuity with his previous work, the question of bio-power. 
However, the fourth lecture of the course, the famous ‘governmentality’ lecture, 
announcing a genuine break in Foucault’s work, followed up, in the next lecture, by 
introducing an even further novelty, the theme of ‘pastoral power’. Having devoted three 
surprise lectures to this new central concept, at the end of the 22 February 1978 lecture, 
as if apologising to his audience for such a long excursion, Foucault promised to finish 
with pastorate and move back to the new central theme of governmentality (Foucault 
2004: 188). And yet, this promise is not maintained, and the next, 1 March 1978 lecture is 
again devoted to pastoral power, though from a very particular angle: the crisis of 
pastorate, identified with the 15-16th centuries; and the medieval background to the 
struggles around pastoral power, discussed under five points, of which the last concerns 
the various eschatological and millenarian movements. This crisis thus evidently became 
so important for Foucault that he suddenly reorganised the already interrupted schedule 
of the course. And yet, to raise perplexity to a further level, he would never return to 
study this crisis; it would be mentioned, and even prominently, around that time,iv but 
then, instead of devoting further research to this topic, Foucault jumped over the period 
and the entire Middle Ages in order to study the early Christian centuries. His argument 
for leaving out the medieval period that pastoral power not being very important then, 
which is not very convincing; but the overlooking of the period of crisis is not even 
justified. In particular, the one page devoted to this theme in the famous ‘Omnes et 
Singulatim’ lecture even fails to distinguish between the problematisation of the pastorate 
by the medieval millenarian movements and in the ‘crisis’ of the 15-16th centuries 
(Foucault 1978: 73-4).  
 
At the limit of the thoughts of Weber and Foucault 
 
Thus, we arrived at identical limits in the thinking of Weber and Foucault; and even in 
two senses. In their genealogies of modernity both Weber and Foucault attributed a 
particular significance to the break inaugurated in Europe by the 16-17th centuries, 
focusing on what was new and also on the particular, chaotic and uncertain conditions 
out of which this new was born, but placing less emphasis on the exact reasons why the 
previous order of thing collapsed; or on the rise and collapse of the Renaissance. Maybe 
they considered this phenomenon as less important, taking for granted that the old 
medieval world (order) had to break down anyway; maybe they were simply accepting, as 
they practically had to, the intellectual atmosphere characteristic of the times after the 
Enlightenment which was markedly hostile to Christianity, and thus considered the 
collapse of the (Christian) medieval world order as not only a necessity but as good in 
itself. At any rate, even Weber and Foucault came to consider that the only thing 
interesting in the complex series of events thought which the Renaissance emerged out 
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of the ‘late’ medieval world, was flourishing, and then collapsed, was the fact that it 
collapsed and the modality of the particular kind of uncertain, unsettled conditions that 
replaced the medieval order and which were the ‘conditions of emergence’ of the 
modern search for a new kind of order. This poses the imperative to study, 
sociologically, the rise and collapse of the Renaissance. 
 Even further, the moment in which their work, driven by its inner logic, was 
supposed to incorporate the conditions of this collapse, whether in the form of the 
process of ‘secularisation’, supposedly characterising the Renaissance and leading to the 
Reformation, or the problematisation of pastoral power, the works of both Weber and 
Foucault took a big leap, over the Renaissance and the Middle Ages, back to Antiquity, 
with the promise of returning to the present – a promise that, due to their untimely 
death, could not be fulfilled. But it is exactly this leap backwards, into deep/ancient 
history, that offers a second modality for taking up the ‘spirit’ of the work of Weber and 
Foucault: a search for the more distant origins of modern culture and civilisation, the 
very origins of the city, and of technology, and the potential role that could have been 
played by religious factors there. 
 
Elements for a sociology of the Renaissancev 
 
While the work of Weber and Huizinga was fundamental in problematising the 
Enlightenment (mis)reading of the Renaissance as heralding the coming of modernity, 
from the perspective of Nietzsche’s concern with ‘backward inference’ it is possible to 
identify a profound shortcoming in both: viewing the Renaissance from its late, decadent 
phase. A genealogy of the Renaissance, however, should be concerned with the main 
features of the Renaissance as a project of renewal, and not being fixated with its end. 
 A sociology of the Renaissance is a particularly difficult undertaking not simply 
because Weber deviated the attention of historically oriented social theorists, but because 
the identification of the Renaissance poses particularly difficult problems. While the 
Renaissance is usually identified with the 15-16th centuries – a periodisation with its own 
problems – scholars time and again come up with extending the term to earlier centuries, 
talking about the ‘Renaissance of the 12th century’ (Haskins 1957), tracing it back to 
Carolingian times, or even the Northumberland of the 7-8th centuries. This is because 
one of the most central features of the Renaissance concerns the rectification of the 
damage done by the ‘Barbarian invasions’ at the collapse of the Roman Empire, by 
sparkling a new flourishing after the terrible centuries of devastation. Thus, the definition 
of the Renaissance to a large extent depends on the particular perspective and guiding 
thread chosen: painting, education, legal thinking, or something else. 
 
The entire issue, however, is more important than the ‘right’ chronology. The central aim 
motivating the return to history had a coherent concern behind it, beyond glorifying the 
past for its own sake; a concern that went way beyond a return to early Christianity or 
the Roman times, and that can be formulated as a concern with the unity of grace. The 
Renaissance had its motivating spirit by efforts to reconstitute a culture, a society, a way 
of life concerned with pursuing the unity of grace. 
 The term ‘grace’, especially as it was understood in the Renaissance, had three 
different, though quite interconnected facets. ‘Grace’ was first of all a theological 
category – though we need to find the exact meaning of the theology of grace at that 
time in history, purified of later layers of meaning.  
 Grace in the theological sense means ‘divine grace’, but this did not mean that 
human beings were merely passive recipients. The most important medieval theology of 
grace was formulated by St Thomas Aquinas, and can be resumed in the famous 
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expression ‘gratia gratis data gratia gratum faciens’ (‘a freely given grace makes one 
graceful/grateful’). This expression captures the heart of Aquinas’s theology concern, the 
relationship between the divine and the human, which is up till today the heart of 
Catholicism as a way of life. According to this the grace of god, rooted in divine love, is 
indeed freely given, does not depend on our will; but this does not mean that the human 
side has no role to play. Any gift of grace received must be carefully maintained and 
nurtured. It must become part of parcel of our daily life, our habit or habitus – 
introducing a term that, following Weber and Elias, Bourdieu placed, perhaps 
unknowingly, at the heart of his sociology. Such a way of life not simply gave an access 
to Paradise, instrumentalising human existence in the sense of ‘buying’ eternal life; rather, 
it was itself a mode of living. The existential basis of medieval Christianity was not 
connected only to the future, a life after death, or the resurrection, the Last Judgment 
and the Second Coming, but also to the past, carrying the promise of valorising this, 
concrete life, in so far as it contained the grace of paradisiac living. 
 Second, and closely connected to this idea of divine grace, the Renaissance also 
manifested a particular care about an aspect of gracefulness that – with a terminology 
only developed in the 18th century – can be called the ‘aesthetics’ of grace, or a concern 
with beauty in work of art, which themselves merely reproduce and render even more 
evident, in a terminology strongly influenced by the thinking of Plato, especially the 
Timaeus, the only Platonic dialogue available fully translated in the Middle Ages, the 
beauty of the world. 
 Finally, the comprehensive vision of grace in the early Renaissance, animating not 
only the vision of the world but penetrating the manner in which this world was lived, 
concerned a social-anthropological aspect of living life as a gift, and therefore basing 
social existence on the offering, accepting and returning of gift; a mode of living closely 
connected to the Christian interpretation of love as charity. 
 
The collapse of the Renaissance as a project, connected to the effective realisation of the 
unity of gracefulness at the level of daily existence can be best identified through the 
manner in which the best genealogists of modernity, Weber, Elias and Foucault each 
picked up one fragment of this project, and proclaimed this fragment as lying at the heart 
of the modern world. Weber focused attention on the Protestant (Calvinist) idea of 
predestination, which at first restricted Christian religion to a concern with individual 
salvation, then proclaimed that this salvation is purely a matter of the inscrutable will of 
God, destroying the delicate balance between divine Grace and human effort, as 
manifested in the habitus, and radically instrumentalising human life, arguing that life in 
the world has no value on its own, and can only be considered as way to manifest one’s 
own status of as an elect. This also implied a full-scale downgrading of the other two 
components of grace: the beauty of the world lost all its meaning and relevance, the 
world becoming reduced, in a manner similar to human life, to the role of an instrument 
helping the revelation of one’s own status, thus an appendix to the methodical 
transformation of human activities into enterprises who could success or fail, according 
to the predetermined or predestined status of the ‘entrepreneur’; while the rejection of 
any church decoration, brought to its conclusion in Zwingli’s church in Zürich, did away 
with any need for beauty in art. Similarly, the reduction of salvation to a purely individual 
level undermined the community principle that was at the heart of the medieval church, 
parishes being replaced by sects that were not communities, only gatherings of the elect, 
and where – ignoring the most basic anthropological features of any community life – 
people who suddenly faced difficulties were not helped by the community but rather 
were thrown out of it, their failure being considered as proof that they did not belong to 
the elect. 
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 The aesthetic fragment of Renaissance grace was picked up by Norbert Elias, in 
his analysis of the court society and its obsession with minutely ritualised and formalised 
behaviour, regulated by books about the right, ‘graceful’ way of conducting oneself in 
court, and of which one of the prototypes – strangely not given any emphasis by Elias – 
was The Book of the Courtier by Baldassare Castiglione, a lifelong friend of Raphael, the 
painter of gracefulness, and who modelled the ideal court on the court of Urbino, native 
city of Raphael. In this court, eventually ruled by the ‘absolute’ prince, ‘by the grace of 
God’, however, any religious or philosophical substance concerning the life of grace was 
subordinated to mere formalities and etiquettes, resulting in the contemporary 
understanding of all rituals and ceremonies as being empty, formal occasions to ‘show 
off’, for long even misleading anthropological investigations of non-Western people. 
 Finally, the socio-anthropological ‘charity’ component was picked up by Michel 
Foucault, who recognised that the disciplinary network of the modern state was based, 
very often in a direct architectural sense, on the medieval network of charities, 
monasteries and fraternities, except that such voluntary institutions were increasingly 
replaced by the police force of absolutism, and then the governmentalisation of the state. 
 
Thus, the modern world, according to these powerful accounts, especially if we put them 
together, was not an autonomous and legitimate development, outcome of a natural 
process of evolution or result of socio-economic or political progress, rather the direct 
outcome of the collapse of the Renaissance. The question to be posed concerns the 
reasons why the Renaissance collapsed; or the identification of the main factor(s) behind 
this collapse. 
 
The Collapse of the Renaissance and the Byzantine Spiritvi 
 
One of the most singular blind spots in the works of Weber and Foucault was identified 
as the lack of attention devoted to the Renaissance, and especially the reasons for its 
collapse. A similar omission concerns the failure discuss, practically at all, the Byzantine 
world, in spite of the fact that any study of Christianity is one-sided if its does not 
incorporate a study of the Orthodox East; any comparative study of civilisations or 
Empires is incomplete without attention being placed on the Byzantium; and the study 
of the medieval world or the Renaissance is incomplete without involving an eternal 
reference point, in comparison with which it had a perennial inferiority complex, the 
surviving Eastern Roman Empire. 
 This omission is by no means restricted to the life-works of Weber and Foucault, 
but incorporates the entire fields of genealogy, historical sociology or comparative 
civilisational analysis. This striking failure of the entire field was pointed out in a recent 
article by Johann Arnason, one of the most important figures of comparative historical 
sociology, who stated that while ‘the Byzantine experience ought to appear as an 
eminently promising field for comparative study […] it has, to put it mildly, not been 
given its due’; a chapter in S.N. Eisenstadt’s 1963 study of Empires being the only 
predecessor Arnason could enlist, apart from an earlier article of his (Arnason 2010: 493; 
see also Arnason 2000). 
 The recognition of the link between the collapse of the Renaissance and the 
collapse of the Byzantine Empire was rendered difficult by the indirect character of the 
connection. In particular, there was a widespread belief, strong in particular during the 
Enlightenment, and no doubt diffused by Byzantine figures, which outright attributed 
the rise of the Renaissance to the arrival of Byzantine ‘sages’, and their supposedly 
beneficial impact on Western civilisation; a position that by today has been completely 
repudiated, but which proved to be quite tenacious, and – based on the principle that the 
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best defence is to attack – prevented any identification of the Byzantium as lying behind 
the collapse of the Renaissance. 
 A further problem is caused by the question how the collapse of the Byzantine 
world could possibly have sparked the collapse of the Renaissance. The answer to this 
can be given by strict Weberian terms: it was a certain kind of Byzantine ‘spirit’ that 
became transplanted and diffused in the West, which lead to the collapse. The question 
now concerns the identification of this spirit, and its careers. 
 Such an undertaking is rendered difficult, however, not only by the lack of 
previous sociological studies, but by the particularly tricky nature of this Byzantine spirit. 
This was because the central character of the Byzantine world in the medieval times was 
the exact opposite of the West – a phenomenon Weber intuited, but did not analyse in 
detail. 
 
According to Weber, while the medieval West can be characterised by the singular 
separation of temporal and spiritual power, or the various kingdoms and the formally 
surviving Empire on the one hand, and the Papacy on the other, the two were united by 
a shared religious world–view, thus animated by the same spirit, the Byzantium was a 
‘theocracy’, in the sense that worldly and religious power was united in the person of the 
emperor, explaining the extreme centralism and bureaucratisation of the Byzantine East. 
The problem is not only that the term ‘theocracy’ is not very useful, as it fails to capture 
the complicated relationship between the emperor and the patriarch, but that Weber 
failed to identify the single most important feature of the Byzantium, a paradoxical 
counterpart to its excessive centralism: that it had, since the beginnings, a radically 
schismatic ‘animating spirit’; and that the schismatic feature of the Byzantium became 
more and more pronounced with every successive crisis of its history, which resulted in a 
non-linear but evidently inexorable shrinking from the rise of Islam up to its final 
collapse. 
 The schismatic nature of the Byzantine world can be understood through the 
Hippodrome, this astonishing ‘place’, which has no equivalent whatsoever in the 
medieval West. 
 
The Hippodrome was an immense building at the heart of Constantinople, 405m long 
and 120m wide, such size being particularly impressive given the rather small 
promontory that constituted the heart of the city. In its original function, as shown by its 
long elliptic shape, it was a stadium for chariot racing, modelled on the Circus Maximus 
of Rome; but – also similarly to it – it was also a place for gladiator fights, wild animals, 
and various theatrical and mime shows. In contrast to Rome, however, where – as a 
result of the barbarian invasions – the Circus Maximus was abandoned and even today 
only its outlines can be seen, due to the continuity in the Byzantium the Hippodrome 
survived, and – as it is the case with any mass popular entertainment in a big city – 
proved to be indestructible. The Church only managed to eliminate its more violent 
aspects, like the gladiator fights, but the rest remained, more or less undisturbed, and for 
long centuries.  
 Thus, instead of the disappearance of the kind of mass spectacles that were 
standard features of the Roman Empire, especially in its decadent stage, but incompatible 
in any manner with the spirit of Christianity, especially in its particularly solemn and 
austere version that was the declared value of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the very 
nature of the Hippodrome became partly altered, and from a place of mere 
entertainment it also became the place where the Emperor exerted its public power, and 
both in its secular and ecclesiastic capacity. It is in the confusion thus produced between 
the secular and the religious, the solemn and the carnevalesque, the manifestation of the 
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splendour of divine light and the staging of the most base kind of mass entertainment, all 
at the same place, that the schismatic nature of the Byzantine spirit can be located; a 
feature that became particularly dominant at the centre of the Byzantium, the imperial 
court. The Byzantine Empire was not simply a ‘court society’, using the terminology of 
Norbert Elias, but of a very particular kind, in which the above confusion and conflation, 
combined with a series of other factors, in particular the entrusting of the education of 
the officials of the imperial bureaucracy to the sophist schools that became reorganised 
in the 2nd century AD, during the ‘Second Sophistic’, and transmitted to the Byzantine 
world, so much so that even the most important Church Fathers received, apart from a 
theological education, a training by the most famous sophist schools of their times, 
resulted in an increasingly pervasive cynicism of the court ‘intelligentsia’, comparable to 
Soviet Russia, a parallel that the works of Alexander Kazhdan, one of the most 
important scholars of the Byzantium made it evident, and which was only deepened by 
the long-standing collaboration between the Sophists and the mimes, which can be 
traced again back to the Roman Empire. 
 The schismatic dualism of the Byzantine spirit, a dogmatic and ritualistic 
solemnity combined with the outrageous ridiculing of the official ideology by the court 
society intellectuals and the street mimes at the very centre of imperial power reached its 
apotheosis in the final stage in the decline of the Byzantine Empire, inaugurated by the 
loss of Gallipoli after the earthquake of 2 March 1354 and the resignation of emperor 
John VI Kantakouzenos, who entered a monastery. In this period, lasting for a full 
century, the eventual collapse was evident, the surviving Empire being limited to an area 
not bigger than contemporary Albania, generating a suffocating, claustrophobic 
atmosphere. It was this spirit that was transmitted to the West, through Italy and 
especially Venice, in a series of waves starting in the last decade of the 14th century and 
culminating with the refugees fleeing the capital city after its sack in May 1453. 
 The carriers of this Byzantine spirit were mimes, who much contributed to the 
re-birth of theatre in the West; charlatans, who took over the organisation of the fairs 
and laid the foundations of modern economic society, that instead of market economy or 
capitalism should be thus termed ‘fairground capitalism’; and the court society sophists, 
the Byzantine dotti who were (mis-)recognised as philosophers and hailed as the saviours 
of Renaissance humanist culture, due to their competence in the Greek language that was 
all but lost in the West. 
 The central locations of the activity of such Byzantine figures, that the places 
from which the ‘Byzantine spirit’ was diffused in the West, were the fairs, scenes of all 
kind of entertainments, and the courts and palaces, centres of power, with a particular 
importance being played by the Burgundy court, with historical links to the Byzantium, 
since the Crusades, and the Papal Court, where the administrative competence of the 
Byzantine ‘sages’ was most welcome, and for whom conversion to Western Christianity 
presented no problem at all, after which they could sell themselves as the official 
representatives of the curia, the very centre of the Western Church, and so – at that time 
– also of the entire civilisation; and the universities and the suddenly burgeoning learned 
academies, from which a new, suddenly secularised learning was spread, and which both 
contributed to and reinforced the corruption of the papal court. 
 
The one expression by which all these various kind of actors – bureaucrats, educators, 
actors, entrepreneurs and writers – could be all collected together is that they were all 
mediators. They did not belong to the still unquestioned leaders of the medieval world, the 
kings or aristocrats on the one hand, and the Church and monastic hierarchy on the 
other, except for the papal court; but they took over the vital roles and functions where 
power, ideas, goods and services were mediated and exchanged. Which had two main 
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consequences: first, that the diffusion of this Byzantine spirit was both extremely quick 
and unperceived – quick, as it used the mediating centres, and unperceived, as once the 
original impulse was given, the ideas, methods and perceptions kept being transmitted by 
indigenous figures; and second, especially in those areas where the sudden shock of the 
Byzantine influence was less immediately felt, and the guilt about leaving the Byzantium 
on its fate, especially strong in Venice, but also Italy in general, due to the events of the 
Fourth Crusade, was less influential, led to a widespread problematisation of the role of 
mediators in social life, in particular in so far as matters of religion were concerned – the 
area where the corrosive influence was most particularly felt, and with the greatest 
resistance. 
 The problematisation of the role of mediators in religious life is equivalent to the 
problematisation of pastoral power, emphasised by Foucault; and the rise of the 
Reformation with its emphasis on the direct relationship to a personal god, emphasised 
by Weber. Thus, from here onward, we can rely on the approaches pioneered by Weber 
and Foucault. 
 
Moving further beyond: The vital significance of pre-history 
 
The horizon of comparative historical sociology or civilisational analysis, even in matters 
concerning the religious roots of the modern world, or of Western civilisation in general, 
rarely if ever goes beyond the rise of Ancient Judaism in the later Mesopotamian period, 
the experiences associated with Abraham (Voegelin 1956), in the context of Hammurabi. 
The themes covered and considered as ultimate reference points for historically informed 
social theory, reinforced by the anthropological perspective propagated by the 
Durkheimian school include monotheism, prophetic religions, the concern with salvation 
(or the problematic of ‘salvation religions’), and the presumably fundamental role played 
by rituals of sacrifice (meaning the bloody killing and ritualistic eating of the sacrificial 
animal, or even human sacrifice), a theme recently returned into the centre of attention 
by the innovative and intriguing but in other respects highly problematic work of René 
Girard.  
 This perspective, which in sociology goes back to Max Weber, and through 
Weber to 19th century Protestant Biblical criticism, a tradition to which Robertson Smith 
was also initiated, explaining the affinity of the Durkheimian anthropological sociology, 
has a serious shortcoming in that it has never really overcome the linear, evolutionary 
perspective of history, modern evolutionism being really only a secularised version of the 
Augustinian philosophy of history, itself relying on the linear Old Testament narrative, 
tracing everything back to the foundational figure of Abraham. 
 The fundamental break with the time horizon imposed by a particular reading of 
the Old Testament, dating the creation of the world to about 5000 BC, was not due to 
Darwin, rather to geology, in particular the work of Lyell, a most important inspiration 
for Darwin – and at the source of Nietzsche’s genealogy as well. Geology also had a 
decisive impact on another discipline, archaeology, rendering possible the study of those 
distant historical periods about which we don’t have written evidence. Archaeology, 
indeed, is one of the most important and most dynamic social science, which over the 
past few decades, due to improved technical methods and a series of breakthrough 
excavations came up with a radically new vision about the origins of human civilisation. 
The problem is that, entrapped by evolutionism and an increasingly narrowing vision of 
history, helped by the current experience of globalisation and its unfounded but 
seductive claims about an unprecedented new age of prosperity the social sciences, and 
sociology in particular, simply ignores these results, as they would upset the linear vision 
of progress enshrined at the heart of the world view projected by the Enlightenment.  
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 In this second part of the paper, inspired by the spirit of Nietzsche genealogy and 
the need for ‘backward inference’, three central instances concerning the ‘prehistory’ of 
civilisation will be presented shortly, with the help of some of the most striking recent 
archaeological findings. 
 
Early Mesopotamia, 6.000-3.000 BC 
 Our vision of Mesopotamia, dominated by the violent wars, sacrificial rituals and 
obsessive centralisation of the Babylonian and Assyrian periods radically changes if we 
shift our focus from the period around 2000 BC to the earliest stages, starting from 6000 
BC. Some recent studies, based on new excavations, especially in Arslantepe and a more 
precise reinterpretation of the available evidence, focus in particular on two factors 
concerning the origins of Mesopotamia. The first is the emphasis placed on the primacy 
of religious factors in this line of civilisational development – a change of position that 
was much sparked by recent findings concerning the conditions of emergence of the 
Neolithic in Turkey, in particular Göbekli Tepe, to be discussed in the next section. 
Thus, for e.g. the building of huge stone temples can be traced back to the 5th 
millennium BC, much preceding the emergence of cities, and even coming before the 
most important developments in agricultural technology (Liverani 1998: 31-3). The 
second factor concerns the stunning artistic quality of simple objects of daily use, dated 
to the 6th millennia and associated with the Halaf, Samarra and Hassuna cultures. The 
striking beauty of hand-painted ware, including bowls, plates, jars and vases (Frangipane 
1996: 73-6; Matthews 2003: 20), used in the everyday life of a society that ignored 
institutionalized social differentiation (Frangipane 2007), not only testifies to the 
existence of high aesthetic standards, but also that a particularly harmonious relationship 
must have existed at that period between human beings and the surrounding world. The 
geometric decoration patterns have been compared to the weaving patterns found in 
Native American basketry (Wengrow 2001: 179-80), and were also considered as having 
cosmological meaning: ‘the decoration of vessels made manifest the operation of a 
cosmology in the world of tangible things, where ideas could be envisaged, meditated 
upon and transmitted across the boundaries of individual life-cycles’ (ibid.: 176). 
 As a further, radical contrast with the later periods, in the entire period there is 
no evidence for wars or large-scale violence. The relationship between the divine and the 
humans were radically different from the scenes of massacres and the lining up of the 
unending rows of prisoners of wars in the honour of the deities that would mark the 
Assyrian period. This can be seen through a particularly perceptive analysis of the earliest 
available images by Henrietta Groenewegen-Frankfort. According to her the oldest 
images from the sacred area of Eanna, demonstrate a particular intimacy and confidence 
with the deity (Groenewegen-Frankfort 1951). In contrast to this, a radical break is 
represented in the Akkadic period, characterised by widespread warfare, where the 
emphasis shifted on representing individual achievement. In the period of Gudea’s 
restoration (c2150-2125 BC), expression of confidence returned; while the distance 
between the divine and the human became marked again under Hammurabi. 
Groenewegen-Frankfort’s judgment was confirmed by Marcella Frangipane, who also 
interpreted the findings of the earlier periods of civilisation in the broader region, going 
back as far as the VI millennium BC, as indicating openness and confidence (Frangipane 
1996: 81-6). 
 The most important related evidence, however, cocnerns the singular absence of 
the religious practice that would be considered, on the basis of later evidence, as the very 
foundation of any religion, and even of culture and society: bloody rituals of sacrifice. 
The point is not simply that no evidence was – as yet – found of such rituals, but that 
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key experts drew the conclusion on the basis of ample available evidence that such a 
practice was inconceivable in early Mesopotamian religion and society. 
 Given its importance, this point requires more detailed substantiation. For this I 
will use two relatively recent papers concerning religion and rituals in Mesopotamia, by 
Tzvi Abusch, an Israeli scholar, student of Thorkild Jacobsen – one of the great classic 
figures of Mesopotamian archaeology and associate of Henri Frankfort; and by Jean-
Claude Margueron, the most distinguished contemporary French scholar of 
Mesopotamia, director of the excavations at Mari from 1979 to 2004. 
 
Tzvi Abusch starts by a clear, programmatic statement: our usual image of sacrifice as the 
violent slaughter of animals and their ritual consumption, shared with the deity, simply 
had no place in ancient Mesopotamian religion, which was rather concerned with the 
presentation of offerings. In order to approach this phenomenon it is necessary ‘to 
understand the Mesopotamian and, in particular, the Sumerian view of human life, the 
gods, and the city’ (Abusch 2002: 38). 
 In Mesopotamia gods were closely linked to a particular settlement. In early 
periods such vital forces were not yet anthropomorphized, also reflected in the fact that 
the temples at the same time were storehouses. They were later represented in a human 
form as ‘a lord in his home’ (Ibid.: 40), codified theologically by the start of the third 
millennium, with the temple no longer being ‘a dwelling place to which a god repaired 
occasionally, but rather a permanent home in which the god and his family lived 
continually’ (Ibid.: 41). 
 The second part of the article discusses, in an exploratory manner, a completely 
different type of ritual offering, characteristic of the Western (Levantine) cultures. As a 
starting point, Abusch quotes the classic work by Leo Oppenheim, according to which 
the basic difference between the two systems of religious devotion is ‘ “the ‘blood 
consciousness’ of the West, its awareness of the magical power of blood” ’, which is ‘ 
“represented best by the Old Testament” ’, and ‘ “which is not paralleled in 
Mesopotamia” ’ (Ibid.: 44). Blood only plays a role in Mesopotamia in a very particular 
type of texts, those which tell the story of the creation of man; texts which furthermore 
‘provide a clue to the significance of the emphasis on blood in the Semitic West and its 
apparent absence in Mesopotamia’ (Ibid.). The original model in Mesopotamian creation 
stories was the potter who created men out of clay; the new component was the addition 
of the ‘flesh and blood’ component, which was furthermore obtained from a ‘killed god’, 
a motive which was ‘an intrusion into the Mesopotamian system of thought’ (Ibid.: 45), 
and was ‘probably due to Western Semitic influences’ (Ibid.: 46). The killing of the god 
was depicted in seals dating to the old Akkadian period, and might have been a 
consequence of the settling of tribal Amorites. According to this new tradition the ‘flesh’ 
was the source of the human ghost, while the ‘blood’ of human intelligence. 
 Such a strong emphasis on blood might have been due to the need to cement 
alliances among nomadic people. Abusch here refers to the theories of Nancy Jay, who 
further developed some of the insights of Robertson Smith by arguing that blood 
sacrifice was used by patrilineal societies, in order to establish a line of descent in 
contrast to the natural lineages produced by women’s childbirth (Ibid.: 46-7, fn.14), and 
which help to make sense of the contrast between tribal and nomadic Semites and urban 
Mesopotamians concerning offerings which emphasise blood and which do not. The 
settlement of tribal Amorites thus led to a profound transformation of the host country; 
as ‘while they absorbed the culture of the urban Mesopotamians of the South, they did 
not fully give up their identities; rather, they transformed the culture that they had 
assimilated, introducing new images into it that were consonant with their own 
background and social situation’, link the obsession with blood (Ibid.: 47). Abusch ends 
 14 
his article by a contrast between the continuous tradition of the Sumerians, which went 
back to Neolithic times, being indigenous to the land which they cultivated, and which 
explain why ‘the central forms of the Mesopotamian temple had little use for blood’, in 
contrast to the ‘blood-consciousness in the Israelite cult’, corresponding to a kin-based 
community structure (Ibid.: 47-8) – a contrast that has striking affinities with Foucault’s 
discussion opposing territorial polis with pastoral power. 
 
Margueron’s essay is based not only on his own experience as excavator, but also on a 
study of the physical shape of the over 150 temple structures so far excavated in 
Mesopotamia and the Levant, suggesting for the first time a comparative study of such 
structures (Margueron 2005). The aim is to recover the type of ritual practices that were 
performed in these temples, and their meaning. Margueron starts by arguing that the 
temples of Mesopotamia should be first of all understood literally as ‘houses of god’; this 
is how they were actually called in the earliest written evidence, and it was confirmed by 
the results of archaeological research. In this sense, there is evident continuity with the 
Neolithic, and such a localization of the deity in a particular place might even be used – 
and here go I beyond the words of Margueron – to explain the phenomenon of human 
settlement, a precondition and not consequence of the rise of agriculture. 
 The next question concerns the exact nature of the ritual that was performed in 
Mesopotamia in a building considered as the house or even the ‘home’ of the deity. 
Margueron starts by reconstructing the physical dynamics of the rituals that took place in 
the temples, arguing that this implied a linear progression towards the deity, who was 
seated on his throne in the centre of the temple. This procession implied a passage 
through a series of limits or boundary markers (gates, doors, thresholds), accompanied 
by ritual actions (Margueron 2005: 8); and then the presentation of offerings or gifts to 
the deity. These offerings were left or poured out at the table that was placed before the 
throne and that separated the god (or its representative) seated on the throne and the 
procession. This table was not an altar, as it was not a place of sacrifice. 
 The centre of the ritual was not the table, rather the throne. The entire linear 
procession advanced towards this goal, and it physically ended there: right behind the 
throne there was a wall, which again marked a limit: the radical separation between two 
worlds, the divine and the human, the boundary beyond which humans must not 
proceed. The throne, on the other hand, marked the spot where the god presented itself 
– the place of an original epiphany and its ceremonial repetition (Ibid.: 12).  
 These conclusions are further supported by a structural analysis of temple design, 
which identified a three-fold division of the buildings (Ibid.: 15). This consists of the 
vestibule, a kind of ‘buffer zone’ through which the procession leaves the realm of the 
profane and enters the sacred; the holy place, where the procession ends and offerings 
are given; and finally the ‘holy of the holies’, the throne, the seat of the god or its 
representative. 
 The last part of the paper is devoted to another structural analysis of the mode in 
which these basic elements are arranged in the various temples of the two regions, 
Mesopotamia and the Levant (Syria and Palestine) (Ibid.: 19ff). Margueron identifies four 
patterns: three oblong and rectangular, where the very shape of the building and the 
location of the doors indicates the direction of the procession; and a fourth, square 
building which alludes to a quite different arrangement, and which is termed the ‘temple-
tower’. The first three both originate and are spread in Mesopotamia; the fourth, 
however, could only be found in the Levant. The ‘temple-towers’ were singular buildings, 
as they did not have an axis, indicating that meeting the divinity somehow became more 
difficult (Ibid.: 22). In these buildings there was no frontal encounter between the 
humans and the deity, just as there was no question of the anthropomorphic 
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representation of the deity. The main ritual action probably took place on the terrace, 
above the building, to which one could get access through stairs; under the open sky, 
faced with the ‘celestial immensity’ (Ibid.: 24). The temporal and spatial limitations of 
this type are remarkable: while the Mesopotamian buildings show a continuity with 
Neolithic culture, the ‘temple-towers’ only go back to the third millennia BC, and they 
are limited to the Western part of the region, to Syria and Palestine. The Eastern-most 
city where such a shape was found was the city of Mari (Ibid.: 24-5).   
Margueron concludes his argument by restating that the main ritual action in 
Mesopotamia was the presentation of offerings, and not the performance of a sacrifice.vii 
In Mesopotamian temples it was structurally impossible to perform an act of ritual 
sacrifice in the sense of the slaughter of a living being; in particular, this applies to all the 
temples of Mari (Ibid.: 29). The only exceptions, again, are the ‘temple-towers’, where 
sacrifices could possibly take place on the terrace.  
Intriguingly, just as the temples of Mari take up a peculiar position ‘in between’ 
the Mesopotamian and Levantine models, the city is in fact located at a liminal juncture, 
in the past as in the present: in between the two broad regions, on the Euphrates, where 
the river takes a turn, and – even more intriguingly – where the current borderline 
between Syria and Iraq crosses the river. It might not be accidental that it was the 
excavator of Mari, this liminal town, who completed a comparative study of the temple 
structures of the two regions, and with so resounding results. 
 
In Mesopotamia from 6000 to about 4000 BC a process of genuine social flourishing 
took place. The question now concerns the factors that ended such conditions. The 
answer, on the basis of the available evidence, is strikingly relevant for contemporary 
times: it was sudden technological progress, due to the discovery of metallurgy, first 
experimented with on mass scale and in a quasi scientific manner in Arslantepe. This 
produced the first industrial revolution based on mass-production around the middle of 
the 4th millennia BC, resulting in the first period of globalisation, during the Ubaid 
period, followed by the sudden magnitudinal growth of Uruk, the first ‘megalopolis’. 
Around 3200 BC, within a relatively short period population density in Uruk increased 
tenfold (Matthews 2003: 110). As a result, by around 2900 BC the city simply exploded, 
growing to the staggering size of 5.5 km2 (Nissen 1990: 80-1). The singularity of the 
phenomenon can be recognised by noticing that at its peak Athens extended to about 2.5 
km2, while Jerusalem to only 1 km2, and even Rome at the height of the Empire, around 
100 AD, was only about twice the size of Uruk (Ibid.). 
 The collapse of this entity, by some called the first ‘world system’, can be marked 
by two events; both connected to Arslantepe. In around 3000 BC the city was sacked an 
destroyed, representing the first such event, advancing the ‘Trojan War’ by about two 
millennia. It was not rebuilt until about 2900, and never regained its former splendour; 
but soon after this reconstruction the first princely sacrificial ritual appeared there; model 
of the kind of rituals that Sir Leonard Woolley uncovered in Sumerian cities, and dated 
to the middle of the 3rd millennium BC. 
 
Göbekli Tepe, 10.000-8.000 BC 
This archaeological site, of fundamental importance for re-thinking the dynamics of 
recent human history, was discovered in 1994, and is dated to the earliest Neolithic 
period (Pre-Pottery Neolithic A), with its use dated between 9500 and 8000 BC. Its 
location is of particular historical significance, given both its classical, religious and 
mythological associations, and aspects that were only rendered evident in the modern 
age. As it is about 20 kms from the historical city of Urfa (called Edessa in the Hellenistic 
period), and is about 60 km-s from the Biblical city of Harran, it is a candidate for being 
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the place of origin of Abraham. But it is also only about 20 miles from the Karacadag 
Mountain, on the slopes of which both einkorn and emmer, the two wild plants from 
which wheat is derived, were domesticated (Heun et al, 1997), and just a 60 miles away 
from Çayönü, where the wild pig was first domesticated. 
 Practically everything we know about the site radically alters our understanding of 
prehistory, even though still only about 5% of the area is excavated, and a proper 
completion of work might take another half a century or so (Schmidt 2000a, 2000b; 
Peters and Schmidt 2004). The site contains huge stone temples, of which four has so far 
been excavated. Such enormous megalithic constructs, which stone statues and building 
blocks occasionally weighting 5 tons, previously were thought impossible to have been 
built at that early stage, before the rise of agriculture and sedentary life. Apart from sheer 
size, the quality and character of the artwork is also stunning: the stones, in particular the 
enormous T-shaped pillars – which average 3.5 to 5 meters, but some are as high as 7 
meters – are carved with beautiful and graceful animals, with no picture showing signs of 
violence, whether in the sense of sacrifice or hunting, though occasionally with 
threatening gestures. Human representation is practically absent. Another striking aspect 
is that the artistic quality was steadily decreasing over time.viii 
 The site simply has no parallels – the earliest occupation of Jericho is from the 
same period, but does not contain anything of significant artistic merit; nearby sites, like 
Nevali Çori and Çayönü are later and less significant; while Çatalhöyük is over 2000 years 
younger. In spite of its huge significance, knowledge about the site is still limited, and 
even highly rated experts fail to recognize its significance and the need to change their 
own frame of reference. This highlighted by a Harvard professor of archaeology who 
suspects slave work behind the monuments – as if slavery in Egypt (as it has been 
reconstructed from late and probably corrupt evidence) were the necessary measuring 
rod for any megalithic construction, and as if slavery as a practice made sense for a not 
yet settled hunter gatherer population. The excavator, Klaus Schmidt resumes the 
significance of the site in a paradigmatic statement, concerned with the temporal 
ordering between Temple and city, or between ritual and utilitarian activities. In both 
counts, we must radically revise our entire perspective: the temple came before the city; 
and rituals have chronological and logical priority over technological advance (Schmidt 
2000a). 
 Even concerning the reasons why and how such a revolutionary change took 
place at that place and time, Schmidt makes a series of most interesting suggestions, 
arguing that the rise of agriculture was due to a much higher degree of interchange and 
mobility than it was previously thought. The Temple was not simply a site of worship for 
people living nearby, but a site of pilgrimage. This helped to bring people together, 
demonstrating – as evidenced from the site – a much higher degree of social 
organization. Thus, the rise of the ‘Neolithic package’, which includes, beyond agriculture 
as a technology, elements of social, political and cultural organization, immediately took 
place at a large as opposed to a small, village scale; or, using contemporary terminology, 
it was immediately a kind of ‘global’ development. 
 Another major question concerns the end of the Temple complex. The facts are 
again stunning: after having been in use for about one and a half millennia, the site was 
suddenly abandoned and covered with about 400-500 cubic meters of land. Some of the 
carved stones show traces of smashing, but otherwise there was no sign of violence. 
Those who used the site for a very long time were closing it down purposefully, burying 
it forever, with an enormous expenditure of energy; and we can again only speculate at 
the reasons. The suggestion is that by that time the erosion generated by extensive 
agriculture and the resulting over-population was visible: the idyllic countryside, so well 
visible from the slightly elevated site of Göbekli Tepe, was increasingly eroded and 
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gradually replaced by the arid landscape that still today dominates the area – the 
agricultural equivalent of the desolate industrial decay created in places like Manchester 
and Liverpool, or Chicago and Detroit. Göbekli Tepe therefore not only instructs us 
about the origins of civilization – of our civilization – but also about the crisis any 
civilization faces if it fails to respect certain limits.  
 
The Upper Palaeolithic, 35.000-9.500 BC 
The last period to be mentioned is by far the most important, concerning both its sheer 
time span and theoretical significance. However, due to the lack of space and time only 
four basic points will be made here. 
 The first concerns the staunch hostility of evolutionary theorising to Palaeolithic 
cave art that at first seems perplexing, but that on a more thorough look becomes 
clinically intelligible. Given that the time horizon opened up by geology and archaeology 
radically dismantled the – dogmatic, Puritanical – reading of the Old Testament time-
line, one would expect evolutionary materialism to welcome the ten-thousand-years’ age 
assigned to cave paintings. Yet, this was not so, as it became particularly evident in the 
debate that broke out about Altamira, discovered in 1879, but recognised as genuinely 
prehistoric only in 1902. The first notices of the discoverer, Marcelino Sanz de Sautuola, 
‘prudent as they were’, were not only disregarded and derided by contemporary 
academics, ‘from the pinnacle of “official science” ’, but argued that the paintings were 
outright fraud, providing us a lesson concerning the need for humbleness when facing 
reality (Beltrán 1998: 8-9, 23-4, 26-7). Most strikingly, some critics argued that they were 
‘the work of conservative Spanish clerics hoping to defend belief in divine creation’; 
while others asserted that ‘the cave had been deliberately created by antievolutionist 
Spanish Jesuits trying to make a laughingstock of the emerging sciences of palaeontology 
and prehistory’.ix 
 Strange as such resistance to new findings by the pioneers of progress and 
science may sound, this becomes intelligible through the upsetting of the evolutionary 
canon by the sheer quality of cave paintings. The champions of progress denigrated the 
Biblical reading of history only in order to be able to proclaim themselves, heirs of the 
Enlightenment, as heralds of the new, unprecedented period of human emancipation and 
development. From that perspective the distant past had to be devalued and denigrated; 
the obscure times of dark ages when human beings were only struggling for survival; a 
perspective incompatible with the stunning qualities of cave paintings. As Picasso 
expressed after his visit to Altamira, ‘none of us could paint like that’ (as in Lewis-
Williams 2002:31).  
 Even more important was the character and quality of daily living exuded from 
these paintings, and many objects of daily usage recovered: a sense of dynamism and 
power ‘derived from delight, the strength of freedom, from being in harmony with 
oneself, in a well-adjusted world’ (Horvath 2013: 24); a mode of living that, according to 
the testimony of the so-called Palaeolithic ‘Venus figurines’, but in particular the 
‘Brassempuoy Lady’, was attributed by female deities. 
 Still, experts bred on the principles of materialist evolutionism and structuralism 
were desperately trying to compress the findings into conventional Enlightenment 
thinking. André Leroi-Gourhan, a major expert of Palaeolithic art spent his life reducing 
prehistoric cave art into categories of linear stylistic development. However, the 
possibility of such evolutionary speculations was ended by the discovery of the Chauvet 
cave in 1994. The quality of these paintings was extraordinary, comparable only to 
Altamira and Lascaux, and in certain ways even anticipating innovations by Leonardo da 
Vinci; and they were dated as the oldest cave paintings so far discovered, painted in 
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between 35.000 to 28.000 years ago. There can be no mistake about such dating, as 
Chauvet is the most precisely dated cave in the world. 
 
Revisiting the Golden Age 
 
Beauty is transient, which alone you seem 
To hold in honour; what beside remains 
No longer charms–what does not charm is dead. 
If among men there were who knew the prize 
The heart of woman, who could recognize 
What treasures of fidelity and love 
Are garnered safely in a woman’s breast; 
If the remembrance of bright single hours 
Could vividly abide within yours souls; 
If your so searching glance could pierce the veil 
Which age and wasting sickness over us fling; 
If the possession which should satisfy 
Wakened no restless cravings in your hearts; 
Then were our happy days indeed arrived, 
We then should celebrate our Golden Age. 
Goethe, Tasso, Act II, Scene 1 
 
Given the revealed hostility of the linear vision of history characteristic of materialist 
evolutionism to cave paintings and the long-standing ignoring of these findings by the 
dominant visions of historical change up to our days, perhaps it is worthwhile to 
interpret such results and the other major archaeological findings included or not in this 
paper in light of our basic historical traditions, the Bible and the thinking of Plato. Plato’s 
vision of the Atlantis is widely considered as the most questionable character of his 
thinking, a pure myth; and yet Plato made a careful distinction between the various 
philosophical myths applied in his dialogues and the ‘myth’ of Atlantis that – he claimed 
– corresponded to real events. Strikingly enough, both the space and time horizons of 
Plato’s story are confirmed by the culture of cave paintings, as it indeed belonged to the 
area of the Atlantic ocean, and collapsed around 9500 BC, or 9000 years before the time 
of Plato, the moment to which the philosopher traced the fall of Atlantis. As if to 
support such foreboding, a recent book by a geologist, who became interested in the 
Palaeolithic only through his involvement with the study of the Cosquer cave, argues that 
a strong case can be made for the seven islands destroyed around Gibraltar due to the 
coincidence of the rising sea levels and a local tsunami that erupted in 9500 BC being the 
historical location of the sunk Atlantis. 
 This perspective can be corroborated from the Old Testament if we shift, as we 
should, our central focus from the late and highly problematic Abraham episode to the 
central event of the entire narrative, the expulsion from the Garden of Eden. While in 
our ‘enlightened’ age even the mention of the term only produces scorn, some major 
figures of European culture did recognise the centrality of such a concern. These were 
not the famous utopian figures, who – like Saint-Simon – were rather obsessed with 
liberal emancipation and technological progress, rather Goethe, as cited in the motto, or 
Franz Kafka, a major admirer of Goethe, who wrote his high-school project on Goethe’s 
Tasso, and whose Zürau aphorisms, recently recognised as being the philosophico-
theological core of his oeuvre (Calasso 2004, 2005; Citati 2007), were devoted to this 
problem of the Golden Age, and whatever has been preserved from this at the heart of 
human beings. And this allows us to return at the very heart of Christian culture, the core 
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of medieval theology, as formulated by Aquinas, and its dismantling under the impact of 
the Byzantine spirit, the idea of a state of grace that is carried as a habitus by those human 
beings who manage to maintain it, with the help of a recognised divine support. This 
state of grace is identical to Kafka’s ‘indestructible’, or the ‘decidedly divine’ in us; the 
heredity that we preserved from the ‘Golden Age’, or that was rekindled in us – and 
where Kafka, in his usual manner, failed to come up with a decisive formulation and 
rather escaped into dilemmas and paradoxes, concerning whether this indestructible was 
destroyed or not with the expulsion. 
 Thus, Goethe, the most Greek, even the most pagan, polytheist – though 
certainly not atheist – of modern European poets, and Kafka, this assimilated Western 
atheist Jew who then became thoroughly preoccupied with his Judaic heritage thus 
returned to the core of orthodox-medieval Christian theology, so much so that few 
contemporary, ‘modernised’ theologian would even there to follow them; but where a 
proper reading of the archaeological evidence, read through the right prism of historical 
sociology and cultural anthropology, offers elements of a striking corroboration. 
 It is at this point that this paper must stop, as such elements cannot be pursued – 
as of yet – any further. But they certainly should be, and this offers some hope in the 
otherwise grim reality of the global neo-liberal consumerist anti-utopia of ‘fairground 
capitalism’. 
 
  
Notes 
 
i For details, see Szakolczai (1998). 
ii It is most revealing that Parsons translated Weber’s self-referential term Sohn ‘son’ by 
‘product’. 
iii Foucault bought his copy of the French edition of the Protestant Ethic on 12 March 
1976; it is extensively marked. 
iv See the course resume (Foucault 2004: 374), and the important though unpublished 27 
May 1978 lecture of ‘criticism’ (Foucault 1990: 37-8). 
v This section is based on my 2007 book about the sociology of the Renaissance 
(Szakolczai 2007). 
vi This section is based on Szakolczai (2007, Chapters 4-5). 
vii This point is reinforced by the analysis of the Sumerian signs used for offerings, which 
are most commonly either a jar full of grain, or a table with two legs (Furlani 1932: 323). 
The meaning of the signs extend to blessing, prayer, sacrifice, and offering (Ibid.: 325). 
viii This is discussed in the article that was the cover story of the June 2011 issue of 
National Geographic. 
ix The former argument was made by Émile Cartailhac, who later changed his mind and 
with a 1902 paper played a major role in authenticating the findings; while the latter by 
Gabriel de Mortillet (Beltran 1998: 9). 
